Posted on February 05, 2009 in Worker's Compensation (WCC)

Maryland courts apply the “going and coming rule” which provides that “injuries received by an employee while going to or returning from his place of employment do not arise ‘out of and in the course of’ employment , and therefore are not compensable” under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Wiley Manufacturing Co. v. Wilson, 280 Md. 200, 206 (1977). The rule is based on the premise that workmen’s compensation law is for injuries incurred by an employee engaged in a service that is growing out of his employment. Id. As such an employee who is going to or coming from work is not rendering services related to his employment and is exposed to hazards as a member of the general public and not as an employee.

There are two generally recognized exceptions to the ‘going and coming rule.’ The first is the ‘premises’ exception and the second is the proximity or special hazard rule. The application of these exceptions turns on the individual facts of each case. Id. at 210.

THE PREMISES EXCEPTION

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 Posted on February 05, 2009 in Automobile Accident

Question Presented: What standard of care is owed by a Maryland driver upon entrance into a controlled intersection, where the traffic signal is blank due to malfunction?

Short Answer: Maryland statutes do not specifically address the standard of care applicable where traffic signals at a controlled intersection fail to operate. Drivers of motor vehicles in Maryland always owe a duty of reasonable care, and whether a driver has exercised reasonable care in a particular circumstance is generally a question of fact for the jury. A driver’s right to assume he has the right of way is an important factor in determining whether the standard for reasonable care is met. Should Maryland’s “boulevard rule” apply to the facts, the “favored driver” is presumed to have the right of way.

Analysis:

In Maryland, drivers of motor vehicles always owe a duty of reasonable, ordinary care. Kaffl v. Moran, 233 Md. 473 (1964). The caution required to meet this standard will vary depending upon the circumstances, but the standard remains the same. Heffner v. Admiral Taxi Ser., Inc., 196 Md. 465.

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 Posted on February 05, 2009 in Premises Liability

Trespass, as defined in Maryland, occurs when the defendant interferes with the plaintiff’s interest in exclusive possession of land by entering or causing something to enter the land. Rosenblatt v. Exxon Company, 335 Md. 58 (1993). Maryland has adopted the view posited by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states that “one is subject to liability to another for trespass…if he intentionally enters land in the possession of the other…or fails to remove from the land a thing which he is under a duty to remove.” Rest.2d. Torts. The damages available to plaintiff pursuant to a cause of action for trespass may be measured either by the loss in value that results (the difference between the value of the land before the trespass and the value of the land afterward) or the cost of reasonable restoration.

A nuisance as defined in Maryland, is anything that unlawfully annoys or does damage to another. It is traditionally a condition on premises or adjacent thereto that is offensive or harmful to those who are off the premises. A public nuisance is a criminal offense involving an interference with the community at large. Rosenblatt, 335 Md. 58 at 79. A private nuisance is a “nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of the land.” Id at 80. Unlike trespass, a cause of action for nuisance is not contingent upon whether the defendant physically impinged upon another’s property, but rather whether the defendant substantially and unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of his property. Trespass interferes with the exclusive possession of land and nuisance interferes with the use and enjoyment of the land. To be a nuisance, the interference, by definition, must be nontresspassory.

In Maryland, a cause of action under a theory of private nuisance requires a showing (1) that the nuisance has diminished materially the value of the property as a dwelling and (2) that the nuisance has seriously interfered with the ordinary comfort and enjoyment of the property. Significant harm is necessary to establish liability for a private nuisance. Examples of the kinds of activities that have been recognized by Maryland courts as private nuisances include polluting smokestacks, corroded tanks leaking hazardous waste into groundwater, barking dogs, noisy trains, and malodorous hog farms.

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 Posted on February 05, 2009 in Search and Seizure

I recently filed a multi-million dollar case against the Baltimore City Police Department involving an illegal and unwarranted body cavity search. Having received many inquiries since than on the law in this area, I will explain the nuts and bolts of the legality of strip searches in Maryland.

The key Maryland cases regarding the reasonableness of a strip search are State v. Nieves, 383 Md. 573 (Md. 2004) and Paulino v. State, 359 Md. 341 (Md. 2007). Both cases reiterate that it is well established both that the State has the burden of proving the legality of a warrantless search and that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment absent some recognized exception. Although a search incident to arrest is a recognized exception to the warrant requirement, a strip search incident to arrest is held to a much higher standard.

The Nieves court held that the reasonable, articulable suspicion standard applies in the strip search incident to arrest context. Nieves, 383 Md. at 596. While strip searches for felony arrests may always be justifiable, strip searches following arrests for minor offenses are generally ‘found wanting’, unless the officer had information that would have led to a reasonable suspicion that the person was carrying weapons or contraband at the time of the arrest. Id. at 592. Nieves was arrested for traffic offenses that included driving on a suspended license, negligent driving, failure to control speed, and giving false accident information. The court found that a strip search following Nieves’ arrest was not reasonable because the nature of the traffic violations for which he was arrested failed to create a suspicion that he was carrying weapons or contraband. Id. at 596. The justification for the search of Nieves based on his prior drug offenses and the fact that he was driving a car whose owner was associated with drugs was also found lacking. The court held that allowing a strip search based on prior drug arrests would amount to allowing a search based on a person’s status, rather than an individualized assessment of the circumstances. Id. at 597.

In Paulino, the defendant was strip searched in public at the scene of his arrest. The police had reasonable suspicion to believe that Paulino possessed drugs and was hiding them in his buttocks, having been given that information by a confidential informant. 399 Md.at 345. Although there may have been suspicion for Paulino’s search, the Court held that “the necessity for such an invasive search must turn upon the exigency of the circumstances and reasonableness.” Paulino, Id. at 352. In determining reasonableness, the court balances the need for a strip search with the invasion of personal rights that in entails, considering the scope of the intrusion, the manner in which it was conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place in which it was conducted. Id. at 356. The issue identified by the court in Paulino was not whether the police had a right to conduct the search, but whether considering the invasive nature of the search, an exigency existed to make it appropriate under the circumstances. Id. at 357. The state was unable to prove the existence of any exigent circumstances that would justify a public strip search. Id. at 360. The need for exigent circumstances may be lessened in Mr. Watkins’ case because his search, unlike Paulino’s, was conducted in a relatively reasonable environment.

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 Posted on February 03, 2009 in Constitutional Violations

Maryland Criminal Attorney – Does a sentence of life without the possibility of parole for a 13 year old constitute cruel and unusual punishment and therefore violate the 8th Amendment to the Constitution? That is exactly the question that the United State’s Supreme Court may consider in a 20 year old case from Florida. There was an article about this case in the New York Times today explaining the basic facts as well as the possibility that the Supreme Court will hear the case. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/03/us/03bar.html?em.

Although the facts of the case are not technically relevant to the 8th Amendment issue, I think they are worth a brief description. The Defendant in the case, Joe Sullivan, was one of three boys who admitted to burglarizing a 72 year old Florida Woman’s home in 1989. Several hours after the burglary, someone entered the home and raped the 72 year old owner. At trial the woman could not identify him but after the court made the defendant repeat something that the rapist had sad to her she testified that “it’s been six months. It’s hard but it [ his voice] sounds similar”. One of his co-defendants also testified against him but it is not clear from the Times’ story what exactly he testified to since he did not claim to have been present during the rape. Additionally, Mr. Sullivan’s attorney did not give an opening statement in the one day trial and his closing argument apparently lasted only a few minutes. The attorney was later disbarred and is still ineligible to practice in Florida. Biological evidence was recovered but was apparently destroyed prior to the advent of DNA evidence. The judge sentenced Mr. Sullivan to life without the possibility of parole and he has now served 20 years of that sentence. The Florida Court of Appeals just rejected a request to review the case and the case was appealed to the Supreme Court.

Although he Supreme Court has not officially agreed to hear the case, it seems probable that they will do so for two reasons. First, the Court has requested that the State of Florida respond to Mr. Sullivan’s petitioner as they chose not to when it was filed. It also seems likely that they will accept it in light of the Court’s rulings in several recent cases involving juveniles including one in which the Court struck down a death sentence for a juvenile on 8th Amendment grounds.

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 Posted on January 30, 2009 in Obstetrician Malpractice

A Buffalo, New York jury has awarded a couple $845,000 in a medical malpractice case against two obstetricians, after a three week trial. The plaintiffs claimed that the woman had to have an emergency hysterectomy after she started bleeding heavily after giving birth to a healthy son. The plaintiffs argued that the doctors should have hastened the mother’s labor, which lasted 20 plus hours, to prevent the bleeding.

I have successfully handled a number of serious injury cases in Baltimore and other counties in Maryland. Many of those medical malpractice / medical negligence / medical error cases involve birth injuries. A recent case that settled for a substantial sum involved almost exactly the same set of facts. A woman gave birth to a healthy child, after which she experienced substantial vaginal bleeding. The hospital, however, did not timely address the situation and, as a result, she lost so much blood that her blood stopped clotting properly. This is called Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (“DIC”) or Consumptive Coagulopathy. She eventually underwent emergency surgery which saved her life, but during the surgery doctors had to remove her uterus. This was a classic case of a woman slipping through the cracks of a hospital. Everybody knew what was going on, but no one assumed responsibility for the matter. The tragedy of this was that the woman was unable have children again as a result.

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 Posted on January 29, 2009 in Domestic Violence

Any experienced criminal attorney in Maryland will tell you that the answer to this question is yes, at least in cases where the State has evidence other than the testimony of the alleged victim. In fact, in a non-domestic violence assault case that was recently decided by the Court of Appeals, Edmund v. State, the Court held that the State need not even identify the victim by name. The only requirement, according to the COA is that the victim be “substantially identified”. http://mdcourts.gov/opinions/coa/2007/94a06.pdf In the Edmund case, which incidentally I tried in the Baltimore County Circuit Court for the trial of this case, the defendant was alleged to have fired 5 shots from a handgun at nearly point blank range at a man whom the defendant claimed had been bullying him for some time. Remarkably, the victim was apparently not hit and he fled the scene. The police canvassed the area and checked the local hospitals with negative results. The police recovered the gun and shell casings and my client and his brother (a correctional officer) both gave written statements describing the incident. My client was indictment on attempted first degree murder, first degree assault and various handgun offenses.

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 Posted on January 28, 2009 in Cancer Malpractice

A Las Vegas jury has awarded a woman $1.5 million in a failure to diagnose cancer medical malpractice case. The woman, a 24-year-old mother, had found blood in her stool and kept having pain when she went to the bathroom. She went to local doctor who repeatedly told her that she was just suffering from hemorrhoids. Seven months after she visited the doctor, she was rushed to the emergency room because of major pain. Shortly after that, she was diagnosed with colon and rectal cancer. She died in 2007 at the age of 27.

A jury found that the doctor violated the standard of care and awarded the woman’s family $2.5 million. It is thought to be the largest medical malpractice verdict there since 2004.
The woman’s family argued that if she’d been properly diagnosed when she first visited the doctor, her chances of surviving the cancer would have been 97 percent, but because of the malpractice, her chances dropped to 50 percent by the time she was diagnosed. The family also claimed that the woman likely would be alive today if doctors had diagnosed her cancer earlier. Instead, before she died, the woman went through chemotherapy and major surgery, including the removal of her uterus and part of her lower intestines.

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 Posted on January 16, 2009 in Probable Cause

Maryland DUI Attorney. I had a somewhat interesting DUI/DWI case with a client who was repeat offender yesterday in the District Court for Baltimore County. My client, who is from West Virginia, was charged with DUI and DWI. The facts of the case were that he was travelling Westbound on Pulaski Highway in Baltimore County, Maryland at approximately 12:15AM on the morning of September 12, 2008. He and a friend were visiting other friends in Maryland and were staying at a motel on Pulaski Highway. They had gone out to dinner and then to a “Gentleman’s Club” and were returning back to the motel.

The motel was located on the East side of Pulaski Highway which is a divided four lane road with two lanes in each direction and a cement barrier separating the lanes. My client and his friend were not intimately familiar with the area and it was dark. They inadvertently passed by the motel and had to proceed approximately a half mile further West on Pulaski to reach the first break in the median. Here, there was a dedicated left turn lane and no signs prohibiting either a left turn or a u-turn.

Because my client did not see any other cars in the area he did not utilize his turn signal prior to executing the legal u-turn. Unfortunately for him, a police officer was behind them. According to the police officer, he had his headlights on but was approximately 300 feet behind my client’s vehicle at the time my client executed the u-turn. According to my client and his passenger, the police officer did not have his headlights on and they never saw him until he activated his emergency equipment.

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 Posted on January 14, 2009 in Driving While Suspended

Driving on a Suspended License is one of the most common charges that causes people to appear in the District Court in Maryland. I appear as a criminal defense attorney almost on a daily bases in these cases. Many first offenders are surprised to find out that a person can actually go to jail for driving while suspended, even if suspended for what seems to be a relatively minor reason. Before I get into what a person should do prior to court if they are charged with driving while suspended in Maryland, let me first describe the most common reasons why a person’s license might be suspended and the penalties associated with each type.

By far the most common reason that a person may end up having his license suspended is for failure to appear in the District Court for a minor traffic violation. Anyone who has ever been to minor traffic court knows that many people fail to appear for their court date. When someone fails to appear in court, even for something as minor as a seat belt ticket, the Motor Vehicle Administration is notified and the person’s license is suspended. In Maryland the maximum penalty for driving while suspended for this reason is 60 days in jail and a fine of $500. A person’s license can also be suspended for failing to pay a fine or failing to appear in court for a ticket received in another state. This did not used to be the case. It used to be that the person’s privilege would only be suspended in the state in which that person failed to pay the fine. Today under what is known as the Interstate Compact, the state in which the person is licensed will be notified of the failure to pay the fine or of the failure to appear in court by the state where the violation occurred and the person’s license is suspended.

Probably the next most common reason that people have their licenses suspended is for failure to pay child support. After that, accumulation of points, conviction of an alcohol related offense and failure to pay a civil judgment related to an automobile accident are the probably the most common reasons that a person’s license can be suspended. These violations are considered more serious and carry a maximum penalty of one year and a fine of $1000. Repeat offenders can receive up to 3 years under certain circumstances if the state files for enhanced penalties. A person who has medical issues such as seizures or who has multiple alcohol related offenses may have his or her license suspended indefinitely by the Medical Advisory Board.

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